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I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquitous wires and cables that carry telephone calls to friends,
data to the Internet, and communications between offices generally occupy
space on poles or in the dirt under streets, which is otherwise known as the
public rights-of-way ("PROW"). These cables also carry "wireless" traffic,
as communications generally are only wireless for the distance between
towers and cell phones, smart phones, or computers. Most of the wireless
backhaul and long-haul transport services are provided over cables installed
at least partially in the PROW.'
Local government units ("LGUs") have varied widely in their PROW
management practices. Many LGUs have recognized that communications
are a beneficial service and crucial for economic development, and, thus,
they have allowed carriers to occupy the PROW in return for one-time
permit charges or similar fees that are limited to recovering the cost of
PROW management and maintenance.2 Other LGUs have seen the
1. PETER BLUHM &. ROBERT LOUBE, COMPETITIVE ISSUES IN SPECIAL ACCESS
MARKETS (rev. ed. 2009), http://nrri.org/pubs/telecommunications/NRRIspel
accessmktsjan09-02.pdf; CRAIG LEDDY, Cellular Backhaul: Is There Gold in Them Thar
Towers?, LIGHT READING CABLE (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.1ightreading.com/
document.asp?docid=188451 &site=1r cable.
2. FCC, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 1, 131 (2009),
http://download.broadband.gov/plan/national-broadband-plan-chapter-6-infrastructure.pdf
[hereinafter NBP] (relating to Recommendation 6.6). The NBP relies on a comprehensive
2003 study of PROW fees in all states conducted by the National Telecommunications and
Information Administration. See Rights-of- Way Laws by State, NAT'L TELECOMM. AND INFO.
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opportunity for a large and continuous revenue source, and they have used
their monopoly control over the PROW to extract large fees that are used to
subsidize other LGU services. These revenue-generating fees are often
established as annual fees, typically either tied to the total linear feet of
4PROW occupancy or set as a percentage of a carrier's gross revenue.
In the years before 1996, when local telecommunications essentially
was a monopoly industry, carriers generally tolerated revenue-generating
fees as a form of indirect taxation on consumers. These carriers either
passed the fees through as line items on customer bills or they absorbed the
fees but added them as expenses to the rate base, and the fees were then
reflected in the carriers' regulated rates. In either case, customers
ultimately paid the inflated PROW charge, presumably in lieu of paying
higher taxes that otherwise would be necessary to support government
services.
Although this arrangement may have been acceptable at the time, two
industry-changing events have occurred that have exposed the danger in
subsidizing other LGU services with revenue-generating PROW fees. The
first is the dramatic increase in competition. Enabled in part by provisions
within the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("FTA"),5 which
required incumbent carriers to lease access to their established networks at
regulated rates, competitors have obtained large market shares in voice and
Internet services. To the extent that these competitive carriers have leased
network facilities from the incumbent carriers, they generally have avoided
directly engaging LGUs in PROW arrangements and have avoided many, if
not all, of these revenue-generating fees. By continuing to charge revenue-
generating fees to the incumbents, LGUs have created an uneven playing
ADMIN. (May 21, 2003), http://ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/staterow/rowtableexcel.htm
[hereinafter NTIA PROW Study]; see NBP, supra note 2, at 135 n.34.
3. NBP, supra note 2, at 131. For example, the Texas Municipal League reports that
"right-of-way rental fees constitute nearly ten percent of many Texas cities' general
revenues . . . ... FCC Appoints Task Force to Study Right-of-Way Rental Fees, TEXAS
MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, http://www.tml.org/legupdates/legisupdate040610c-rightofway.asp
(last visited Nov. 15, 2011).
4. NBP, supra note 2, at 131; see also NTIA PROW Study, supra note 2.
5. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified
at scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
6. The FCC reports that, as of the end of 2009, service to approximately thirty percent
of the 153,000,000 local telephone lines was provided by competitive providers rather than
the incumbents. FCC, LOCAL TELEPHONE COMPETITION: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2009,
5 (2011), http://www.fcc.gov/DailyReleases/Daily Business/201 1/dbO 1 1/DOC-
304054Al.pdf. Approximately sixty percent of households resided within areas where there
were three or more available providers of wireline or fixed mobile Internet access services.
FCC, INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF DECEMBER 31, 2009, 8 (2010), http://
www.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/DailyBusiness/2010/dbl208/DOC-303405Al.pdf.
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field by forcing certain carriers to pay for inflated cost inputs designed to
subsidize other LGU services, while their competitors are often immune.
This competitive imbalance threatens the vitality of incumbent carriers and
ultimately threatens the deployment of new and advanced services.
The second event is the explosion of broadband Internet use and its
ascension to becoming an essential service. The Bush and Obama
administrations have established accelerated broadband deployment as a
national priority.7 In furtherance of these goals, the FCC has established
numerous policies and aspirations for broadband deployment.8 To upgrade
and build out their networks, carriers naturally need increased access to the
PROW. LGUs that seek to subsidize other government services by
charging revenue-generating PROW fees are a formidable obstacle to this
goal.
Congress recognized the potential for LGUs to use their monopoly
power over the PROW to create competitive imbalances and to obstruct
network expansion. Congress, therefore, included a provision in the FTA at
47 U.S.C. § 253 ("Section 253") to preempt certain LGU practices. Section
253(a) preempts any LGU requirement that "may prohibit or have the effect
of prohibiting"9 the provision of telecommunications services. Congress
included at Section 253(c) a limited exception to preemption, which saves
LGU requirements setting "fair and reasonable compensation... on a
competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis . .. The intent of
Sections 253(a) and (c) was to balance the national goals of fostering
competition and encouraging deployment of advanced services with the
LGU's historical management interests over the PROW-including the
collection of fair and reasonable fees.II
As discussed below, many LGUs unfortunately-although not
surprisingly-have ignored Section 253 and pressed forward with fee
structures based upon localized revenue needs rather than concepts of
7. Declan McCullagh, Bush: Broadband for the People by 2007, CNET (Apr. 26,
2004), http://news.cnet.com/2100-1028_3-5200196.html ("In a speech in Minneapolis on
Monday, Bush said 'every corner' of the United States should be in reach of high-speed
Internet links by 2007."); John Poirier, Obama Announces Broadband Grants to Spur Jobs,
REUTERS (Jul. 2, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/02/us-obama-broadband-
idUSTRE6612KD20100702 ("U.S. President Barack Obama announced on Friday nearly
$800 million in loans and grants for the build-out of broadband networks to reach homes,
schools and hospitals.").
8. See, e.g., NBP, supra note 2.
9. 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (1996) (emphasis added).
10. § 253(c) (emphasis added).
11. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. Municipality of Guayanilla, 450 F.3d 9, 15 (1st
Cir. 2006) (Section 253 intended to balance interests in competition with LGU management
practices); see discussion infra Part II.
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fairness and reasonability. Equally as unfortunate, the federal courts have
inconsistently applied both Sections 253(a) and (c).
With respect to Section 253(a), courts initially closely followed the
FCC's 1997 California Payphone decision, where the FCC had defined
"effect of prohibiting" as a requirement that "materially inhibits or limits
the ability of any competitor or potential competitor to compete in a fair
and balanced legal and regulatory environment."1 2 These courts recognized
that a LGU requirement that conditions use of the PROW on payment of
revenue-generating fees quite naturally meets this standard. They then
analyzed whether the fees were saved as "fair and reasonable
compensation" under Section 253(c).' More recently, however, the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits issued decisions in which they paid lip service to
California Payphone while they errantly applied a much more stringent
standard that essentially demands jroof that the LGU requirement actually
prohibits the provision of services. 4 Under these decisions, a carrier would
need to show that the revenue-generating fees actually prevented it from
providing services before the courts would analyze whether the fees were
"fair and reasonable" under Section 253(c). This actual prohibition
standard under Section 253(a) reduces Section 253 to a toothless standard
in these circuits, imposing no practical limit and allowing LGUs to hold the
PROW hostage to extract exorbitant rates.
With respect to Section 253(c), courts have continuously struggled
over the definition of "fair and reasonable compensation." Some courts
have required fees to be limited to PROW management costs or at least to
be related to management costs. Other courts have allowed for a "fair
market value" element for the PROW to be included in the fee, but they
have done so without explaining what an appropriate value methodology
would be other than determining the highest dollar amount that carriers are
willing to pay.16 No court has engaged in a serious economic analysis as to
whether the PROW was a scarce resource that generates any value in a
12. California Payphone Ass'n, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 14191,
para. 31 (1997) [hereinafter California Payphone] (emphasis added).
13. See e.g., XO Missouri, Inc. v. City of Maryland Heights, 256 F. Supp. 2d 987, 994-
95 (E.D. Mo. 2003); New Jersey Payphone Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of West New York, 130 F.
Supp. 2d 631, 638 (D.N.J. 2001), ajfd, 299 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2002); Bell Atlantic-
Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's Cnty,49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 817 (D. Md. 1999), vacatedon
other grounds, 212 F.3d 863 (4th Cir. 2000); AT&T Communications of the Southwest, Inc.
v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582, 593 (N.D. Tex. 1998). See discussion infra Part II.B.
14. See Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego, 543 F.3d 571 (9th Cir.
2008), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 2860 (2009); Level 3 Communications, LLC v. City of St.
Louis, 477 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2007). See discussion infra Part II.C-D.
15. See discussion infra Part II.B.
16. Id.
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competitive market. The result of these inconsistent decisions has created
uncertainty both for carriers and LGUs.
The FCC now has an opportunity to end these inconsistent
interpretations and restore Section 253 to its rightful role in the process of
ensuring a fair field of play for all competitors. As part of the America
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Congress directed the FCC to
develop a plan with the goal of ensuring that "all cFeople of the united states
[sic] have access to broadband capability . . . ." On March 16, 2010, the
FCC issued its "National Broadband Plan" ("NBP "), 8 in which it set forth
a comprehensive plan for accelerated broadband deployment. Among other
things, the FCC acknowledged in the NBP that "[t]he cost of deploying a
broadband network depends significantly on the costs that service providers
incur to access conduits, ducts, poles and rights-of-way on public and
private lands."' 9 The FCC estimated that "[c]ollectively, the expense of
obtaining permits and leasing pole attachments and rights-of-way can
amount to 20% of the cost of fiber optic deployment." 20 The FCC further
acknowledged that "[s]ecuring rights to [PROW] is often a difficult and
time-consuming process that discourages private investment." 21 To
streamline this process, the FCC stated that LGUs "should take steps to
improve utilization of existing infrastructure to ensure that network
providers have easier access to poles, conduits, ducts and rights-of-way." 22
The FCC recognized that "there are [already] limits to state and local
policies; Section 253 of the [FTA] prohibits state and local policies that
impede the provision of telecommunications services while allowing for
rights-of-way management practices that are nondiscriminatory,
competitively neutral, fair and reasonable." 23 The FCC also acknowledged,
however, that "disputes under Section 253 have lingered for years, both
before the FCC and in federal district courts."24 Based on this proliferation
of disputes, the FCC on April 7, 2011 issued a Notice of Inquiry focused on
PROW issues ("PROW NOT').25 The PROW NOI seeks comments on
17. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
§ 6001(k)(2), 123 Stat. 115, 516 (2009).
18. See NBP, supra note 2.
19. Id at 127 (footnote omitted).
20. Id. (footnote omitted).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 131.
24. Id. (footnote omitted).
25. Acceleration of Broadband Deployment: Expanding the Reach and Reducing the
Cost of Broadband Deployment by Improving Policies Regarding Public Rights of Way and
Wireless Facilities Siting, Notice of Inquiry, WC Docket No. 11-59 (2011) [hereinafter
PROW NOJ.
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methods by which to improve PROW access, including a method by which
to set reasonable charges.26 The FCC stated that the PROW NOI "is a
necessary step towards determining whether there is a need for coordinated
national action to improve rights of way and wireless facilities siting
policies, and, if so, what role the [FCC] should play in conjunction with
other stakeholders." 27
This Article calls on the FCC to use the PROW NOl as an opportunity
to state a uniform standard for application of Sections 253(a) and (c). As
the agency charged with implementation, the FCC clearly is empowered to
issue regulations and interpretative decisions under the FTA, which it has
done on many occasions. The FCC can use the PROWNOl either to serve
as a formal rulemaking or as a forum in which it can issue guidance for
Section 253 standards. Indeed, in a recent amicus curiae filing with the
Supreme Court, the FCC recognized the inconsistent application of Section
253 and vowed to bring harmony to these decisions by issuing authoritative
rulings when the opportunity arose.29 It now has that opportunity.
Part II of this Article traces the enactment and inconsistent application
of Section 253, and it explains the faults in the analyses undertaken by
some of these courts. Part III of this Article explains why-based on these
inconsistent court decisions-it is important and necessary for the FCC to
reconfirm its California Payphone standard for showing an "effect of
prohibiting" under Section 253(a), and to then make clear that a
requirement meets this standard if it conditions use of the PROW on the
payment of revenue-generating fees. This would remove the focus from the
impact that PROW fees have on a particular carrier-which is a subjective
26. The PROW NOI specifically identifies six categories for consideration: (1)
timeliness and ease of the permitting process; (2) the reasonableness of charges; (3) the
extent to which ordinances or statutes have been updated to reflect current communications
technologies or innovative deployment practices; (4) consistent or
discriminatory/differential treatment; (5) presence or absence of uniformity due to
inconsistent or varying practices and rates in different jurisdictions or areas; and (6) other
rights of way concerns including "third tier" regulation or requirements that cover matters
not directly related to rights of way use or wireless facilities siting. Id. at paras. 12-33.
27. Id. at para. 9.
28. The FCC includes on its website a chart that (although out-of-date) describes the
various rulemakings and other proceedings it has undertaken to implement the FTA. FCC,
DRAFT FCC IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE FOR THE TELECOMMUNICATIONs ACT OF 1996
(1997), available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Reports/implsched.html. Although the FCC
issued guidelines once before concerning the enforcement of Section 253, the guidelines did
not address the issues raised in this Article. See Suggested Guidelines for Petitions for
Ruling under Section 253 of the Communications Act, Public Notice, 13 F.C.C.R. 22970
(1998). Further, the FCC specifically proposed issuing rules as a potential remedy in
response to issues raised in the NOI. PROWNOI, supra note 25, para. 10.
29. See infra Part II.C.
143Number 1]
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factor that varies based on the size and economic efficiency of the carrier-
and would place the focus on whether the fee is objectively "fair and
reasonable compensation" under Section 253(c). Part IV then explains why
it is important and necessary for the FCC to also clarify that "fair and
reasonable compensation" under Section 253(c) means payment for
management costs plus the price LGUs could charge if the PROW space
were offered in competitive markets. This would return sound economic
principles to determining a PROW fee rather than allowing courts to
continue to rely simply on the highest dollar amount carriers are willing to
pay, which is the cornerstone of monopoly pricing and clearly is not within
the "fair and reasonable compensation" component of Section 253(c).
II. SECTION 253 AND CASES DECIDED THEREUNDER
A. Enactment of Section 253
The goals of the FTA are expressed in its formal title as follows: "An
Act [t]o promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure
lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications
consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies." 30 To accomplish these goals, Congress
included provisions in the FTA at 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-52 that require
incumbent local exchange carriers to interconnect and to lease unbundled
elements of their networks to competing providers in order to allow these
providers to offer competitive services without having to replicate the
incumbent networks in their entirety.3 1 The Supreme Court characterized
the FTA as a procompetitive act designed to end local monopolies by
opening up the incumbents' networks:
Until the 1990's, local phone service was thought to be a natural
monopoly. States typically granted an exclusive franchise in each local
service area to a local exchange carrier (LEC), which owned, among
other things, the local loops (wires connecting telephones to switches),
the switches (equipment directing calls to their destinations), and the
transport trunks (wires carrying calls between switches) that constitute
a local exchange network. Technological advances, however, have
made competition among multiple providers of local service seem
30. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
31. See AT&T Comm., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582, 586 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
For a comprehensive article discussing the purpose and progress in implementing Sections
251 and 252, see Roy E. Hoffinger, "Cooperative Federalism" Gone Wrong: The
Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
375 (2003).
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possible, and Congress rec tly ended the longstanding regime of
state-sanctioned monopolies.
Congress recognized that the interconnection and unbundling
obligations in Sections 251 and 252 were of little value if LGUs could use
their historical monopoly power over the PROW to impede competition
within the telecommunications market and the deployment of advanced
services by all. 33 It, therefore, included Section 253, which preempts
certain LGU actions with respect to regulation of carriers and their use of
the PROW. Section 253 states in relevant part:
(a) In General
No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal
requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability
of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications
service ....
(c) State and Local Government Authority
Nothing in this section affects the authority of a State or local
government to manage the public rights-of-way or to require fair and
reasonable compensation from telecommunications providers, on a
competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis, for use of public
rights-of-way on a nondiscriminatory basis, if the compensation
required is publicly disclosed by such government.
The legislative history of Section 253 reveals that it was intended to have a
broad preemptive scope and reserve very limited PROW management
32. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 371 (1999). The Court further stated
that the intent of the FTA was to take "the regulation of local telecommunications
competition away from the States." Id. at 378 n.6. See also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
857 (1997) (explaining that the FTA was "an unusually important legislative enactment"
that has changed the landscape of telecommunications regulation).
33. See, e.g., Petition of Minnesota, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R.
21697, para. 9 (1999) (Section 253 "is designed to ensure that state and/or local authorities
cannot frustrate the [FTA's] explicit goal of opening all markets to competition."); Pub.
Util. Comm'n of Texas, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 3460, para. 23
(1997) ("Sections 251 and 252 complement and supplement Section 253 by removing
operational and economic barriers to entering the local market."); see also AT&T Comm.,
Inc., 8 F. Supp. 2d at 591 ("Congress's intent was to remove all barriers to entry in the
provision of telecommunications services by preempting all state and local legal
requirements that directly or indirectly prohibit market entry.").
34. Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 253(a), (c). Section 253(b), which is omitted
from above, provides, "Nothing in this section shall affect the ability of a State to impose,
on a competitively neutral basis and consistent with section 254, requirements necessary to
preserve and advance universal service, protect the public safety and welfare, ensure the
continued quality of telecommunications services, and safeguard the rights of consumers."
Id. at § 253(b). This provision was intended to preserve the rights of state utility
commissions in areas of historical concern and, because it only applies to states, it is rarely
invoked in Section 253 cases challenging LGU PROW provisions. Section 253(b) would
only arise in a challenge to an LGU PROW regulation if "a state specifically delegated the
state authority to its local governments." Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc. v. City of Coral
Springs, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1307 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
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activities for local governments. Senator Gorton in his comments said that
Section 253 is a "very, very broad prohibition against state and local"
regulations of telecommunications companies. 35 Senator Feinstein in her
comments offered specific examples of the types of limited restrictions that
Congress intended to permit under Section 253(c), including:
(1) Regulat[ing] the time or location of excavation to preserve effective
traffic-flow, prevent hazardous road conditions, or minimize noise impacts; .
(4) Requir[ing] a company to place its facilities underground, rather than
overhead, consistent with the requirements imposed on other utility
companies; ...
(6) Requir[ing] a company to pay fees to recover an appropriate share of the
increased street repair and paving costs that result from repeated excavation;
(8) Enforc[ing] local zoning regulations; and
(9) Requir[ing] a company to indemnify the City against any claims of injury
arising from the company's excavation.36
B. Initial Decisions Under Section 253
Shortly after the FTA's enactment, the FCC in 1997 issued its
decision in California Payphone,37 in which the FCC examined a local
ordinance that prevented payphone providers from installing outdoor
payphones on private property in a particular area, while permitting the
installation of payphones indoors on private property and outdoors on
public rights-of-way.38 The FCC examined whether the ordinance 'ha[d]
the effect of prohibiting' the ability of any entity to provide payphone
service in [the relevant area]." 39 In answering that question, the FCC
established the test for "effective prohibition" under Section 253(a) by
stating that a local regulation effectively prohibits the provision of a
telecommunication service if it "materially inhibits or limits the ability of
any competitor or potential competitor to compete in a fair and balanced
legal and regulatory environment."40 The FCC concluded that, in light of
35. 141 CONG. REc. S8212 (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
36. 141 CONG. REc. S8172 (daily ed. June 12, 1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein,
quoting letter from the Office of City Attorney, City and County of San Francisco).
37. California Payphone, supra note 12.
38. See id. at para. 28.
39. Id. at para. 31.
40. Id. (emphasis added). The FCC soon reiterated this standard. See Pub. Util.
Comm'n. of Texas, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 3460, para. 22 (1997);
TCI Cablevision of Oakland Cnty., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12 F.C.C.R.
21396, para. 98 (1997).
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the options available to payphone providers in the area in question and the
absence of proof that these other options were less economical, the
ordinance did not prohibit payphone providers from providing service in
the area.41
Federal courts soon were confronted with challenges to local PROW
practices following California Payphone.42 These courts settled on a
two-step analysis when considering federal preemption under Section 253:
(1) determine whether the local provision is prohibitory under Section
253(a); and (2) if so, determine whether the LGU has met its burden of
showing that the fees are fair and reasonable under Section 253(c).43 Courts
were clear that a regulation "need not erect an absolute barrier to entry in
order to be found prohibitive."" Applying this framework, courts initially
preempted a broad array of franchise fees and other excessive PROW
charges on telecommunications carriers. This included decisions issued by
the Northern District of Texas in AT&T Communications of the Southwest,
Inc. v. City of Dallas (preempting four percent gross revenue fee);45 the
District of New Jersey in N.J Payphone Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of West New
York 2reempting fee based on highest bids submitted for exclusive PROW
use); and the Eastern District of Missouri in XO Missouri, Inc. v. City of
Maryland Heights (preempting five percent gross revenue fee).47 Several of
41. California Payphone, supra note 12, at para. 31.
42. These claims initially were presented under both the Constitution's Supremacy
Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides the vehicle for a claim for a private right of
action. The majority of courts now hold, however, that there is no private right of action
under Section 253 and that the Supremacy Clause provides the exclusive vehicle for
recourse in federal court. See, e.g., NEXTG Networks of NY, Inc. v. City of New York, 513
F.3d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 2008); Sw. Bell Tel., LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir.
2008); Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego, 490 F.3d 700, 716-18 (9th Cir.
2007), aff'd en banc, 543 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2860 (2009);
Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1265-67 (10th Cir. 2004).
43. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. Municipality of Guayanilla, 450 F.3d 9, 15-16
(1st Cir. 2006); City ofSanta Fe, 380 F.3d at 1269; Qwest Corp. v. Elephant Butte Irrigation
Dist., 616 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118 (D.N.M. 2008); New Jersey Payphone Ass'n, Inc. v.
Town of West New York, 130 F. Supp. 2d 631, 636 (D.N.J. 2001); see also Petition of
Minnesota, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 21697, 21704 n.26 (1999)
("Although the party seeking preemption bears the burden of proof that there is a violation
of section 253(a), the burden of proving a statute, regulation, or legal requirement comes
within the exemptions found in sections 253(b) and (c) falls on the party claiming the
exception applies.").
44. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1269; see also RT Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d
1264, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 2000) (the challenged regulation need not be "insurmountable" to
be preempted); Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 450 F.3d at 18; TCG New York, Inc. v. City of White
Plains, 305 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
45. 8 F. Supp. 2d 582, 593 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
46. 130 F. Supp. 2d 631, 638 (D.N.J. 2001), aff'd, 299 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2002).
47. 256 F. Supp. 2d 987, 994-95 (E.D. Mo. 2003); see also Qwest Comm. Corp. v. City
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these more significant decisions concerning PROW fees are discussed
below.48
49In Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's County, a U.S.
District Court invalidated a three percent gross revenue franchise fee
requirement as an impermissible "revenue-raising measure[]."50 The court
began by stating that the franchise fee requirement, in combination with
other nonfee provisions, was effectively prohibitive under Section 253(a)
because the provisions created a substantial barrier to entry in the relevant
market.5' Turning to the "fair and reasonable" compensation analysis under
Section 253(c), the court noted that
[i]f local governments were permitted . .. to charge franchise fees that
were unrelated either to a telecommunications company's use of the
public rights-of-ways or to a local government's costs of maintaining
and improving its rights-of-way, then local governments could
effectively thwart the FTA' pro-competition mandate and make a
nullity out of section 253(a).
The court stated that "the proper benchmark is the cost to the County
of maintaining and improving the [PROW] that [the carrier] actually uses.
Furthermore, to be 'fair and reasonable,' these costs must be apportioned to
[the carrier] based on its degree of use, not its overall level of
profitability."53 The court concluded that, "[s]ince nothing in the ordinance
indicates that the County set the level of its 'right-of-way char e' based on
these two factors, the 'right-of-way charge' violates the FTA."
Shortly thereafter, the Sixth Circuit issued a seemingly contradictory
and much-criticized opinion in TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn.5 5 There
the new entrant carrier challenged a requirement that it pay a four percent
of Berkeley, 146 F. Supp.2d 1081, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("Fees charged against
telecommunications carriers must be directly related to the carrier's actual use of the local
rights-of-way."). But see City of Portland v. Elec. Lightwave, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d 1049,
1073-75 (D. Or. 2005) (upholding five percent gross revenue fee under Section 253).
48. Although a discussion of such cases is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth
noting that several state and federal courts have held that excessive franchise fees constitute
taxes under state laws and must be enacted in accordance with tax legislation procedures.
See, e.g., Diginet, Inc. v. Western Union ATS, Inc., 958 F.2d 1388, 1400 (7th Cir. 1992);
Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. City of Billings, 80 P.3d 1247 (Mont. 2003); City of
Hawarden v. US West Comm., Inc., 590 N.W.2d 504 (Iowa 1999); AT&T Co. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 620 N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. 1993).
49. 49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 817 (D. Md. 1999), vacated on other grounds, 212 F.3d 863
(4th Cir. 2000).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 814-15.
52. Id. at 817.
53. Id. at 818.
54. Id. at 818-19.
55. 206 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2000).
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gross revenue franchise fee in circumstances where the incumbent was
immune from such fees under state law. Contrary to the consensus view
that Section 253(a) provided the basis for an action with Section 253(c)
being a safe harbor, the Sixth Circuit concluded that each section provided
an individual cause of action.56 The court, thus, started by analyzing
whether the fee was "fair and reasonable" under Section 253(c). With little
analysis, the Sixth Circuit held that the "totality of the circumstances"
supported the district court's conclusion that the four percent charge was
fair and reasonable considering the amount of the PROW use contemplated
(twenty-seven miles), the amount that other providers would be willing to
pay, and what the carrier had agreed to pay in other jurisdictions.57 The
court further said that the immunity of the incumbent to the fee did not
make it discriminatory absent proof that the incumbent was able to leverage
this freedom into a competitive advantage. The Sixth Circuit concluded
that, once demonstrated to be fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory under
Section 253(c), the fee by definition could not be prohibitive under Section
253(a)."
As noted, City of Dearborn was quick% criticized by other courts. In
TCG New York, Inc. v. City of White Plains, the Second Circuit analyzed
a challenge to an LGU requirement for a five percent gross revenue
requirement on new entrants, where the incumbent once again enjoyed
immunity under state law. The Second Circuit adopted the FCC's
California Payphone "effect of prohibiting" standard, and then, contrary to
the holding in City of Dearborn, it held that the combination of the fee and
other nonfee provisions of the franchise ordinance at issue were prohibitory
under Section 253(a).61 With respect to Section 253(c), the Second Circuit
recognized that there was not a consensus on whether PROW fees should
be cost-based or viewed under the "totality of the circumstances," so it
chose to avoid that issue by analyzing the discriminatory nature of the
fee.62 Rejecting City of Dearborn, the Second Circuit held that
discriminatory application of the franchise fee was per se in conflict with
56. Id. at 622-24. No court has agreed with City of Dearborn that Section 253(c)
provides an independent basis for action. See, e.g., Level 3 Comm., LLC v. City of St.
Louis, 477 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2859 (2009); BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 252 F.3d 1169, 1187-89 (11th Cir. 2001). The
federal government, including the FCC, has similarly stated that this part of the City of
Dearborn holding was in error. St. Louis Amicus Brief see infra note 95, at 19.
57. City ofDearborn, 206 F.3d at 624-25.
58. Id. at 625.
59. Id.
60. 305 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2002).
61. Id. at 76-77.
62. Id. at 79.
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Section 253(c). The court stated that "the Sixth Circuit's statement [in City
of Dearborn] that [the carrier] failed to show that [the incumbent] was
undercutting its competitors and creating a barrier to entry misses the point
that fees that exempt one competitor are inherently not 'competitively
neutral,' repardless of how that competitor uses its resulting market
advantage." Indeed, courts since City of White Plains have consistently
struck down PROW fees that are discriminatorily applied. 64
65
In Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, the Tenth Circuit struck down
an appraisal/lease fee structure that had purported to capture the PROW's
fair market value. In that case, the LGU required carriers seeking PROW
permits to obtain an appraisal for the specific PROW from an LGU-
approved agent and then, based on this appraisal, to pay an annual rental
fee. While this method might have been consistent with Section 253 if
applied using sound economic principles (as outlined below), the initial
permit request yielded an appraisal of a $6,000 annual rental rate for a
single twelve-by-eighteen foot concrete pad. Applying the Calfornia
Payphone standard, the Tenth Circuit found that, if this fee were similarly
applied throughout the LGU, the appraisal/lease system would represent a
"massive increase" in PROW fees, which the court concluded was
sufficient to demonstrate an effective prohibition under Section 253(a).67
Analyzing the fees under Section 253(c), the Tenth Circuit noted that there
was a split of authority between whether PROW fees must be cost-based or
subject to the "totality of the circumstances" test in City ofDearborn.68 The
court stated that it did not have to decide the appropriate standard, because
the structure failed both tests-the LGU admitted the fees were not cost-
based, and the LGU failed to consider "the extent of the use contemplated,
the amount other telecommunications providers would be willing to pay,
and the impact on the profitability of the business."69
In Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. Municipality of Guayanilla,70 the
First Circuit issued a comprehensive decision in which it invalidated a five
percent fee on gross revenues. In that case, the First Circuit examined both
63. Id. at 80.
64. See e.g., Qwest Comm. Corp. v. City of New York, 387 F. Supp. 2d 191, 194
(E.D.N.Y. 2005); Montgomery Cnty. v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 326 B.R. 483, 494
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Silver Star Tel. Co., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R.
16356, para. 10 (1998).
65. 380 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2004).
66. Id. at 1270-71.
67. Id. at 1271.
68. Id. at 1272.
69. Id. (citing TCG Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2000)).
70. 450 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2006).
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the impact that the fee would have on the carrier's operations within the
municipality and the impact it would have on the operations of the carrier
across the commonwealth if the fee were adopted by every other
franchising authority in Puerto Rico. The court stated:
Given the interconnected nature of utility services across communities
and the strain that the enactment of gross revenue fees in multiple
municipalities would have on [the carrier's] provision of services, the
Commonwealth-wide estimates are relevant to determining how the
ordinance affects [the carrier's] "ability 1  to provide any interstate or
intrastate telecommunications service."
Applying the California Payphone standard, the court held that the
five percent franchise fee was effectively prohibitive under Section 253(a)
because it would "negatively affect [the carrier's] profitability;" give rise to
"a substantial increase in costs for [the carrier];" and "place a significant
burden on [the carrier]," thereby "strain[ing the carrier's] ability to provide
telecommunications services."7
Turning to Section 253(c), the First Circuit recognized that courts had
varied on whether Section 253(c) required fees to be limited to LGU cost
recovery, but the court said it need not decide the issue because it agreed
with the district court's reasoning that "fees should be, at the very least,
related to the actual use of rights of way and that 'the costs [of maintaining
those rights of way] are an essential part of the equation."' 73 The First
Circuit rejected the LGU's argument that the gross revenue structure was a
per se appropriate measure for PROW use stating:
There are two problems with this argument. First, the appellants
concede that the 5% fee applies to the entire revenue derived from calls
that use any portion of the rights of way, regardless of whether the call
traverses over one inch or 100 feet of the public rights of way. Thus,
the fee charged does not directly relate to the extent of actual use of
public rights of way. Second, the appellants provide no rationale for
why it is "fair and reasonable" for the Municipality to charge 5%, as
opposed to another percentage, of the revenue generated from these
calls. The appellants provide no information or estimates regard g the
amount of fees that they expect to collect through the ordinance.
Although the First Circuit concluded that even under the "totality of the
circumstances" the challenged ordinance would fail, it also rejected the
City ofDearborn test under Section 253(c).7 5
71. Id. at 17 (quoting Section 253(a)).
72. Id. at 18-19.
73. Id. at 22 (quoting Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 354 F. Supp. 2d at 114 (brackets in
original)).
74. Id. at 22.
75. Id.
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C. Eighth Circuit Decision in City of St. Louis and Ninth Circuit
Decision in County of San Diego
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits recently adopted their own standard
under Section 253(a) in which they essentially required carriers to show
that it is impossible to comply with the challenged requirement and still
provide service. This was a stark departure from prior decisions,
particularly within the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, in its very first Section 253
case, City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp.,76 the court struck down a host of
municipal regulations unrelated to management of the PROW, including
excessive application fees. The court specifically held that the "fees
charged under the franchise agreements are not based on the costs of
maintaining the right of way, as required under the [FTA]." The Ninth
Circuit modified this holding in Qwest Communications Inc. v. City of
Berkeley, wherein it qualified that all non-cost-based fees were not
automatically preempted but instead must be examined in the context of the
regulation as a whole.7 9 Nevertheless the court still preempted the beyond-
cost permit fee at issue because the LGU's only justification was that
carriers could be excused from paying if they submitted to a comprehensive
procedure to determine whether they qualified as a common carrier.80
It was not until its decision in Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County
of San Diego8I that the Ninth Circuit applied a different Section 253(a)
standard. In that case, the full panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed decisions
by the district court and appellate panel that had held an ordinance placing
various requirements on the placement, camouflage, and maintenance of
wireless transmission towers violated Section 253(a). As a precursor to its
decision, the Ninth Circuit claimed that the panel in City of Auburn had
twisted the words of Section 253(a) by improperly inserting an ellipses into
the phrase, "No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local
legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability
of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications
service," so that it read, "No State or local statute or regulation, or other
State or local legal requirement, may . .. have the effect of prohibiting the
ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate
76. 260 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled by Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County
of San Diego, 543 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2008).
77. Id. at 1176.
78. 433 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 2006).
79. Id. at 1257.
80. Id. at 1257-58.
81. 543 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2008), cert denied, 129 S. Ct. 2860 (2009).
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telecommunications service." 82 The Ninth Circuit claimed that, by inserting
this ellipses, the City of Auburn panel allowed for the word "may" to
modify the term "have the effect of prohibiting," and, thus, had allowed for
preemption of regulations based on speculation that the regulation "might
possibly" prohibit services.83 The court stated that this was improper and
that the phrase "effect of prohibiting" required proof of "actual or effective
prohibition" of a telecommunications service.84
Up to this point, the Ninth Circuit's analysis was not inconsistent with
California Payphone. Indeed, the FCC in Calfornia Payphone had initially
stated the truism that Section 253(a) required a showing of an actual or
effective prohibition of service. The FCC also had not allowed for a
regulation to be preempted based on the "mere possibility" of an effective
prohibition (although the Ninth Circuit's claim that City of Auburn and
other courts had based their holdings on the "mere possibility" of a
prohibition is incorrect, as discussed below). The FCC instead held in
California Payphone that an effective prohibition would be found if the
requirement "materially inhibits or limits the ability of any competitor or
potential competitor to compete in a fair and balanced legal and regulatory
environment." 8 6 The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Calfornia Payphone
set forth the proper Section 253(a) standard.87
For reasons unexplained, however, the Ninth Circuit in County of San
Diego then refused to apply Cahfornia Payphone and failed to analyze
whether the ordinance at issue materially inhibited or limited the ability of
the carrier to compete in a fair and balanced legal and regulatory
environment. The court instead simply held that, although the ordinance
heavily regulated placement and design of wireless towers, it did not
specifically "prohibit[] the construction of sufficient facilities to provide
wireless services to the County of San Diego."88 Because there was not an
actual prohibition on the construction of sufficient facilities to provide
services in the county, the Ninth Circuit held that the ordinance was not
effectively prohibitive under Section 253(a). If its holding were not enough
82. Id. at 576 (citing City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1175 (9th Cir.
2001)) (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 577-78. As noted by the Ninth Circuit, the "may . . . have the effect of
prohibiting" standard was initially crafted by the Maryland District Court in Bell Atlantic-
Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's County. Id. at 576 (citing Bell Atl.-Md., Inc. v. Prince
George's Cnty., 49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814 (D. Md. 1999)).
84. Id. at 578.
85. California Payphone, supra note 12, at para. 38.
86. Id. at para. 31.
87. County ofSan Diego, 543 F.3d at 578.
88. Id. at 579-80.
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to demonstrate that it was now requiring an actual prohibition to be shown
under Section 253(a), the Ninth Circuit went on to list examples of the very
limited regulations that might possibly still be prohibitive under Section
253(a):
If an ordinance required, for instance, that all facilities be underground
and the plaintiff introduced evidence that, to operate, wireless facilities
must be above ground, the ordinance would effectively prohibit it from
providing services. Or, if an ordinance mandated that no wireless
facilities be located within one mile of a road, a plaintiff could show
that, because of the number and location of roads, the rule constituted
an effective prohibition. We have held previously that rules effecting a
"significant gap" in service coverage could amount to an effectiXprohibition. . .and we have no reason to question that holding today.
The Eighth Circuit employed an almost identical analysis in applying
a similarly narrow interpretation of Section 253(a) in Level 3
Communications, LLC v. City of St. Louis.90 The challenged LGU
requirement in this case was for payment of various levels of linear foot
charges for use of the PROW. Like the Ninth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit
stated that it considered prior decisions as having incorrectly applied a
liberal interpretation of Section 253(a) based on the word "may" in the
statute, which it said allowed preemption based on the "mere possibility" of
a prohibition. 91 The court, thus, held that to demonstrate preemption a
carrier "must show actual or effective prohibition, rather than the mere
possibility of prohibition."92 Like the Ninth Circuit, the Eighth Circuit
acknowledged that the proper test for determining an effective prohibition
had been set forth in California Payphone. Like the Ninth Circuit,
however, the Eighth Circuit then failed to actually apply the Cahfornia
Payphone analysis. Instead, the Eighth Circuit noted that the carrier had
admitted that it "cannot state with specificity what additional services it
might have provided had it been able to freely use the money that it was
forced to pay to the City for access to the public rights-of-way." 93 The
89. Id. at 580 (citation omitted). The ramifications of County of San Diego were
immediately felt. The Ninth Circuit applied the new standard to mean that the mere fact that
a provider continues to operate in a locality is conclusive evidence that any state or local
regulation, however draconian, survives review under Section 253(a). See Time Warner
Telecom v. City of Portland, 322 Fed. Appx. 496, 498 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting challenge to
certain in-kind requirements imposed by city because the requirements "do not have the
effect of prohibiting the provision of telecommunications services, as demonstrated by [the
carrier's] continued operation.") (emphasis added) (relying on County of San Diego, 543
F.3d at 578).
90. 477 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2007).
91. Id. at 532-33.
92. Id. at 533.
9 3. Id.
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Eighth Circuit concluded that "[t]his admission establishes that [the carrier]
has not carried its burden of proof on the record we have before us." 94
The FCC had an opportunity to comment on these two decisions when
the Supreme Court requested that the federal government file an amicus
curiae brief to address the certiorari petitions filed in these cases, which
were consolidated. 95 Acting on behalf of both the government and the
FCC,96 the Solicitor General reiterated in her amicus brief that California
Payphone set forth the proper application of Section 253(a),97 and she
stated that the standard had become the consensus test by the appellate
courts.98 The Solicitor General then acknowledged that "aspects of the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits' opinions might be read to suggest an unduly
narrow understanding of Section 253(a)'s preemptive scope . . . . The
Solicitor General noted in particular that the Eighth Circuit in City of St.
Louis "appears to have accorded inordinate significance to [the carrier's]
inability to 'state with specificity what additional services it might have
provided' if it were not required to pay [the LGU's] license fee." 00 The
Solicitor General stated, "[t]hat specific failure of proof- which the court
of appeals seems to have regarded as emblematic of broader evidentiary
deficiencies in [the carrier's] case-is not central to a proper Section 253(a)
inquiry."' 0 With respect to County of San Diego, the Solicitor General
noted that "[p]ortions of the Ninth Circuit's decision . . . could be read to
suggest that a Section 253 plaintiff must show effective preclusion-rather
than simply material interference-in order to prevail."102 The Solicitor
General said that this was plainly improper because "limiting the
preemptive reach of Section 253(a) to legal requirements that completely
preclude entry would frustrate the policy of open competition that Section
253 was intended to promote."
10 3
94. Id. at 533-34.
95. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Level 3 Comm., LLC v. City of
St. Louis, 477 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2007) (No. 08-626); Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County
of San Diego, 543 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-759) [hereinafter St. Louis Amicus
Brief].
96. The St. Louis Amicus Brief was signed both by the Solicitor General and attorneys
from the FCC. Id at 22.
97. Id. at 9.
98. Id. ("The courts of appeals uniformly recognize that the FCC's California
Payphone Order . . . prescribes the applicable standard for determining whether a legal
requirement has the effect of prohibiting the ability to provide a telecommunications
service.") (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 8.
100. Id. at 13 (quoting Level 3 Comm., LLC, 477 F.3d at 533).
101. St. Louis Amicus Brief, supra note 95, at 13.
102. Id. at 14.
103. Id.
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While clear in its criticisms, the Solicitor General, nevertheless,
advocated that the Supreme Court not review these decisions.104 The
Solicitor General based her recommendation on the fact that each of the
courts had cited Calfornia Payphone as the controlling standard, even
though they had not properly applied it.105 The Solicitor General said that
because the circuits purportedly agreed on the legal standard to be applied,
the FCC could address any lack of uniformity caused by disagreements
among the circuits applying the California Payphone decision by issuing
authoritative rulings, which the Solicitor General said would govern the
disposition of Section 253(a) claims brought in federal court. 106
D. Analysis of City of St. Louis and County of San Diego
Although the Solicitor General's decision to advocate against
certiorari was curious,lo7 her concern that the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
misapplied California Payphone was well-founded. Indeed, it should be
fairly obvious that requiring "actual or effective prohibition of the
provision of a telecommunications service" as mandated by the Eighth and
Ninth Circuits is a more stringent standard than the Calfornia Payphone
"materially inhibits or limits the ability of any competitor or potential
competitor to compete in a fair and balanced legal and regulatory
environment" standard.'os The differences in language are readily apparent:
First, the California Payphone term "materially inhibits or limits"
connotes a regulation that significantly burdens a party but does not
104. Id. at 17-18.
105. Id. at 18.
106. Id. (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 982-83 (2005)).
107. This recommendation reflects a questionable view of the Executive Branch and its
role in making certiorari recommendations, when the Executive Branch essentially
expresses concern only with the precedential impact of the decisions and not justice for the
parties before it. More importantly, the recommendation reveals a shocking degree of
naivet6 by its implication that the precedential impact will be minimal because courts in
these circuits will ignore the holdings of the circuit courts and correctly apply California
Payphone. This implication predictably was proven wrong in the very next Ninth Circuit
Section 253 case following County of San Diego, where the panel held that evidence of
continued market operation was conclusive evidence of lack of an effective prohibition. See
Time Warner Telecom v. City of Portland, 322 Fed. Appx. 496, 498 (9th Cir. 2009).
108. Compare Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego, 543 F.3d 571, 578
(9th Cir. 2008) (the phrase "effect of prohibiting" requires proof of "actual or effective
prohibition" of a telecommunications service) and Level 3 Communs., L.L.C. v. City of St.
Louis, 477 F.3d 528, 533 (8th Cir. 2007) (to demonstrate preemption a carrier "must show
actual or effective prohibition, rather than the mere possibility of prohibition") with
California Payphone, supra note 12, para. 31 (an effective prohibition will be found if the
requirement "materially inhibits or limits the ability of any competitor or potential
competitor to compete in a fair and balanced legal and regulatory environment.").
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necessarily rise to the level of actually prohibiting the provision of service.
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits' term "actual or effective prohibition of a
telecommunications service" connotes a regulation that either specifically
prohibits a carrier from providing service or is so onerous as to leave little
choice but to not provide service.
Second, the California Payphone term "materially inhibits or limits"
is further relaxed when placed in front of the second clause of the
Calfornia Payphone definition, "the ability of any competitor or potential
competitor to compete." This emphasis on the "ability to compete" is much
broader than the Eighth and Ninth Circuits' focus on whether services may
be provided at all.
Third, the final clause in the California Payphone definition, "in a fair
and balanced legal and regulatory environment," further broadens the scope
of Section 253(a) as it describes the attributes of the market in which the
carrier must be allowed to compete. This stands in contrast to a market that
is unreasonable or discriminatory, which the "actual or effective
prohibition" standard would appear to tolerate so long as the carrier could
provide service.
That the Eighth and Ninth Circuits' rigid "actual or effective
prohibition" standard is more stringent than the California Payphone
standard is even more apparent upon reviewing the decisions issued by the
FCC in which it has applied its California Payphone standard. The FCC
consistently has preempted and/or questioned LGU requirements under the
California Payphone standard that likely would have survived under the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits' analysis. This includes:
* Public Utility Commission of Texas, where the FCC reviewed a
state law requiring new entrants to the local market to rely at least
in part on facilities not owned by the incumbent.109 As with the
regulations at issue in the Ninth's Circuit decision in County of San
Diego, such requirement did not actually prohibit the provision of
service, it merely regulated the types of facilities that could be
used. 0 The FCC nevertheless preempted the requirement.1II
* Western Wireless Corporation,112 where the FCC stated that a
"universal service fund mechanism that provides funding only to
109. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Texas, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 3460
(1997).
110. Id. at paras. 73-75.
111. Id. at paras. 74-75.
112. W. Wireless Corp. Petition, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 16227
(2000).
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[incumbents]" would likely violate Section 253(a) because it would
"effectively lower the price of [incumbent] -provided service
relative to competitor-provided service" and thus "give customers a
strong incentive to choose service from [incumbents] rather than
competitors." 13 The requirement did not actually prohibit the
provision of service; it merely dictated how universal service
funding would be distributed, but the FCC held that the
requirement likely was preempted. 114
* Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service,115 where the FCC
explained that "[s]tate designation of an unreasonably large service
area could ... violate section 253," because "an unreasonably large
service area could greatly increase the scale of operations required
of new entrants." Again, the requirement at issue did not
actually prohibit the provisions of services (and, indeed,
encouraged the provision by defining a service area broadly), but
the FCC nevertheless held that it likely was preempted.117
* TCI Cablevision of Oakland County, Inc., where the FCC
expressed significant concern over the following:
[P]rovisions that . . . require franchisees to interconnect
with other telecommunications systems in the City for the
purpose of facilitating universal service, provide for
regulation of the fees charged for interconnection, and
mandate "most favored nation" treatment for the City under
which a franchisee providing a "new service, facility,
equipment, fee or grant to any other community ... within
the State . . ." shall mvide the same to the . . . [city
granting the franchise].
Here, too, the requirement at issue did not actually prohibit the
provisions of services, but the FCC nevertheless held that it likely
was preempted.12 0
* Petition of Minnesota,121 where the FCC expressed doubt over the
lawfulness of an agreement between Minnesota and a developer
113. Id. at para. 8.
114. Id. at paras. 9-11.
115. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776
(1997).
116. Id. at para. 129.
117. Id.
118. TCI Cablevision of Oakland Cnty, Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12
F.C.C.R. 21396 (1997).
119. Id at para. 105.
120. Id. at paras. 106-110.
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that provided the developer with exclusive access to certain rights-
of-ways alongside the Minnesota highway system, on the grounds
that the agreement "appear[ed] to have the potential to adversely
affect the provision of telecommunications services by facilities-
based providers, in violation of the provisions of section
253(a)."122 The "adversely affect" standard clearly was a lower
threshold than "actual or effective prohibition," yet the FCC
applied this standard and held that the requirement likely was
preempted. 2 3
These cases stand in stark contrast to the Ninth Circuit's list in County
of San Diego of the narrow examples that might be preempted under its
standard, which included: 1) requiring all facilities to be placed
underground where such placement would render the network inoperable;
2) requiring all wireless facilities to be placed more than one mile from a
road where such placement again would render the network inoperable; and
3) requiring facilities to be placed in a manner so as to cause a significant
gap in service coverage.124 These types of hypothetical examples obviously
would actually prohibit services in that they would render all or a large part
of a carrier's network inoperable, thereby making compliance with the
regulation impossible. These examples are nothing like the requirements
that the FCC preempted and/or called into question in the cases discussed
above.
As a final matter, it must be pointed out that the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits' purported distinguishing of the cases allegedly applying a "mere
possibility" standard is really a red herring and a distraction from the
failure of these courts to follow the law. First, it is irrelevant whether these
prior decisions used a "mere possibility" standard, since the Calfornia
Payphone standard is clearly acknowledged to be the proper standard and,
as explained, it was clearly not followed by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.
But regardless, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits were wrong in that, although
some courts quoted Section 253(a) with the ellipses ("may . . . have the
effect of prohibiting"), none actually held that Section 253(a) was triggered
by a "mere possibility" of a prohibition. Although the courts in Prince
121. Petition of Minnesota, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 21697
(1999).
122. Id. at para. 3 (emphasis added); see id. at para. 22 ("evidence in the record that
utilizing rights-of-way other than the freeway rights-of-way to install telecommunications
infrastructure is substantially more expensive than using the freeway rights-of-way")
(emphasis added).
123. Id. at paras. 21-22.
124. Sprint Telephony PCS v. County of San Diego, 490 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2007), aff'd,
543 F.3d 571, 580 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
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George's County and City of Auburn had quoted Section 253(a) with the
ellipses inserted,125 neither of these courts had concluded that there was a
"mere possibility" of prohibition; instead, each court held that the
requirement at issue would indeed create an effective prohibition. 126
Moreover, the First Circuit in Municipality of Guayanilla, the Tenth Circuit
in City of Santa Fe, and the Second Circuit in City of White Plains did not
cite this abbreviated quotation of Section 253(a), and each of these courts
similarly held that the requirement at issue would create an effective, rather
than speculative, prohibition.127 Each of these three courts also cited and
relied on the FCC's California Payphone definition of an effective
prohibition.128
III. THE FCC SHOULD CLEARLY CONFIRM THAT REVENUE-
GENERATING FEES ARE EFFECTIVELY PROHIBITIVE UNDER SECTION
253(A) AND ARE TO BE APPROPRIATELY ANALYZED UNDER SECTION
253(c)
The FCC now has the opportunity in its PROW Docket to bring
uniformity to Section 253, as it said it would do in the St. Louis Amicus
Brief when the opportunity arose. The FCC should begin by clearly
confirming that revenue-generating fees are effectively prohibitive under
Section 253(a), so that the inquiry can be shifted to whether the fees are
125. Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's Cnty., 49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814 (D.
Md. 1999); City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001).
126. City of Auburn, 260 F.3d at 1176 ("Taken together, these requirements 'have the
effect of prohibiting' [the carrier] and other companies from providing telecommunications
services ... and create a substantial and unlawful barrier to entry into and participation in
the Counterclaim Cities' telecommunications markets.") (citation omitted); Prince George's
Cnty., 49 F. Supp.2d at 814 ("After reviewing the various provisions of the ordinance being
challenged in this case, the court finds that the County's telecommunications franchise law
unquestionably has the effect of prohibiting the provision of telecommunications services by
[the carrier] and other telecommunications companies seeking to do business in Prince
George's County.").
127. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. Mun. of Guayanilla, 450 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2006) ("We
agree with the district court that [the carrier] has established that Ordinance No. 40
'materially inhibits or limits the ability' of [the carrier] 'to compete in a fair and balanced
legal and regulatory environment."') (quoting TCG New York, Inc. v. City of White Plains,
305 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2002)). See also Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258,
1271 (10th Cir. 2004) ("The City argues that a mere increase in cost cannot be prohibitive . .
. . As stated in RT Communications, however, an absolute bar on the provision of services is
not required ... . It is enough that the Ordinance would 'materially inhibit' the provision of
services . . . . Given the substantial costs generated by this Ordinance, it meets that test and
is prohibitive under [Section 253(a)].") (citations omitted); TCG New York, Inc., 305 F.3d at
76-77 ("In light of the obstacles that the Ordinance poses to [the carrier's] ability to
compete in White Plains on a fair basis, we conclude that the Ordinance violates § 253(a).")
128. Municipality of Guayanilla, 450 F.3d at 18; City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d at 1271;
TCG New York, Inc., 305 F.3d at 76.
HeinOnline  -- 64 Fed. Comm. L.J. 160 2011-2012
PUBLIC RIGHT-OF- WAY
"fair and reasonable" under Section 253(c). In so doing, the FCC should
clearly confirm that County of San Diego and City of St. Louis were
decided incorrectly to the extent that they failed to actually apply the
Cahifornia Payphone standard.
There are several separate yet related reasons as to why Congress and
the FCC intended revenue-generating fees to qualify as an effective
prohibition under Section 253(a) and to be analyzed under Section 253(c).
First, it is evident from the language in the Cahifornia Payphone
standard that the FCC did not intend "effect of prohibiting" under Section
253(a) to act as a significant hurdle before the propriety of PROW fees
would be considered under Section 253(c). The preemption of a
requirement that "materially inhibits or limits" the ability of a carrier to
compete in a "fair and balanced legal and regulatory environment" under
California Payphone is very similar to the language of Section 253(c),
which saves a requirement that requires "fair and reasonable compensation
. . . on a competitively neutral and nondiscriminatory basis . . . ." It is thus
difficult to imagine an unfair, unreasonable, or discriminatory fee under
Section 253(c) that would not materially inhibit or limit the ability to
compete in a fair and balanced environment under Section 253(a)-the
same emphasis on fairness, reasonability, and nondiscrimination is
embedded in both inquiries. Because the Calfornia Payphone Section
253(a) inquiry and the Section 253(c) inquiry appear nearly identical, most
courts actually applying Cahifornia Payphone's analysis devote little time
to Section 253(a) and far more time to whether fees are fair and reasonable
under Section 253(c). The court in Prince George's County, in fact,
recognized that a finding that a fee did not meet the Section 253(c) criteria
amounted to a per se effective prohibition under Section 253(a) when it
noted that
[i]f local governments were permitted ... to charge franchise fees that
were unrelated either to a telecommunications company's use of the
public rights-of-ways or to a local government's costs of maintaining
and improving its rights-of-way [under Section 253(c)], then local
governments could effectively thwart the FTA's pro-competition
mandate and make a nullity out of section 253(a).129
Second, it is further evident from the FCC's application of the
California Payphone standard that the FCC did not intend "effect of
prohibiting" under Section 253(a) to act as a significant hurdle before the
propriety of PROW fees would be considered under Section 253(c).
Although the FCC has not had occasion to analyze the propriety of a
129. Prince George's Cnty., 49 F. Supp. 2d at 817.
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specific fee provision in a case before it,130 the cases and dockets discussed
immediately above demonstrate that the FCC considers Section 253(a) to
present a relatively low bar by preempting regulations that not only
"materially inhibit or limit" carriers, but also might "adversely affect
[carriers]," 3 ' "give customers a strong incentive to choose service from
[incumbents] rather than competitors," or "greatly increase the scale of
operations required of new entrants."133 Imposing revenue-generating fees
for PROW use is clearly on par with these types of prohibitive regulations.
In fact, the FCC heavily implied in another amicus brief that, although the
question had not arisen in a matter before it, revenue-generating fees likely
would be prohibitive under Section 253.134
Third, common sense would support the notion that "effect of
prohibiting" under Section 253(a) should not act as a significant hurdle
before the propriety of PROW fees are considered as fair, reasonable, and
discriminatory under Section 253(c). Otherwise, an LGU could seemingly
charge fees in any amount, no matter how excessive or discriminatory, so
long as the carrier could not show the impossibility of complying with the
requirement without discontinuing or abandoning a particular service.
Under such a scenario, a Fortune 15 company such as AT&T with
$124,000,000,000 in 2010 reported revenues would have no defense
against excessive or discriminatory fees imposed by a single LGU, whereas
a single-market independent telephone company using the exact same
PROW could show a prohibition, assuming the fees rendered the service
provided by this single-market carrier unprofitable and forced the company
to shut down. AT&T presumably would have to wait until it was on its
130. A case currently pending before the FCC could provide the FCC with this
opportunity. In Level 3 Communications, Level 3 Communications is requesting the FCC to
exercise its authority under Section 253(d), which gives the FCC concurrent jurisdiction
with federal courts over Section 253 claims, to invalidate several agreements signed by
Level 3's predecessors and the New York State Thruway Authority. As of the date of this
Article, no decision had been issued. Level 3 Commun. LLC, Petition for Declaratory
Ruling that Right-of-Way Rents Imposed by the New York State Thruway Authority Are
Preempted Under Section 253, FCC WC Docket No. 09-153 (rel. July 23, 2009).
131. Petition of Minnesota, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 21697, para.
3 (1999).
132. W. Wireless Corp. Petition, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 16227,
para. 8 (2000).
133. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8847 para.
129 (1997).
134. Brief of the FCC and United States as Amici Curiae at 14 n.7, TCG New York, Inc.
v. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2002) (Nos. 01-7213, 01-7255) [hereinafter
TCG Amici Briefj.
135. AT&T INC., A NETWORK OF POSSIBILmES: AT&T INC. 2010 ANNUAL REPORT 30
(2010), http://www.att.com/Common/aboutus/annual-report/pdfs/ATT2010_Full.pdf.
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virtual death bed, having suffered the thousand cuts of excessive PROW
fees across the country, before it could bring any type of action. And in that
case, such an action likely would be too late to seriously challenge such
fees, as it undoubtedly would be met with the LGU defense that it was just
following the "group-pricing" practices of other LGUs that AT&T
previously had accepted. Such a toothless preemption standard, available to
only the smallest or least profitable carriers, plainly would not further
Congressional interests in opening markets to competition and deploying
advanced services.
Fourth, a natural reading of Section 253(a) supports the notion that
revenue-generating fees are simply effectively prohibitive under Section
253(a). That is because any licensing or franchising fee requirement, even
if arguably modest, quite literally "prohibits . . . the ability of an[] entity to
provide" service because a carrier cannot enter the market or continue use
of its network unless and until it obtains authorization from the regulatory
authority and pays the demanded fees. While at first blush that might seem
to be a lax standard, it must be remembered that the preemptive scope of
Section 253 was intended to be "broad"1 36 and, in particular, to prevent the
establishment of a "third tier" of regulation by the LGU. 137 In this context,
it would make sense for Congress to have intended to preempt any local fee
requirement that was not otherwise specifically preserved in Section 253(b)
(for states) and Section 253(c) for states and LGUs. As discussed above,
when it comes to fees, the emphasis logically should be on whether the
requirement at issue is "fair and reasonable" as an objective matter under
Section 253(c), as opposed to whether the requirement actually prohibits a
particular carrier to provide service as a subjective matter under Section
253(a).38
Fifth, revenue-generating PROW fees threaten deployment of new
and advanced services and thus meet the California Payphone standard of
"materially inhibit[ing] or limit[ing]" the ability to compete. As the First
136. 141 CONG.REc. S8212 (daily ed. June 13, 1995) (comments of Sen. Gorton).
137. TCI Cablevision of Oakland Cty., Inc., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12
F.C.C.R. 21396, para. 105 (1997).
138. It should be noted that some courts have avoided the issue of whether excessive
PROW fees standing alone are prohibitive by allowing carriers to also rely on nonfee
provisions to show an effective prohibition, and then analyzing the fees under Section
253(c). See, e.g., TCG New York, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d 67, 76-77 (2d Cir.
2002); XO Missouri, Inc. v. City of Maryland Heights, 256 F. Supp. 2d 987, 992 (E.D. Mo.
2003). This process essentially allows an end-run around Section 253(a) when analyzing
certain fee provisions, theoretically allowing fees to be struck down under Section 253(c)
because they were ancillary to objectionable nonfee provisions, where the fees might have
otherwise avoided scrutiny under Section 253(c) if enacted as stand-alone provisions. This
end-run around mechanism would be unnecessary under a natural reading of Section 253(a).
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Circuit recognized in Municipality of Guayanilla, the dollars that are
required to be paid by carriers to LGUs often represent a one-for-one loss
of dollars that otherwise would be used for network investment. 139 This
diversion of investment funds is exacerbated when the excessive fee
structures are adopted by LGUs in neighboring communities.140 The FCC
recognized the impact of excessive and obstructive LGU management
practices in its NBP where it acknowledged that "[s]ecuring rights to
[PROW] is often a difficult and time-consuming process that discourages
private investment."l 41 As these authorities show, paying revenue-
generating PROW fees ultimately will materially inhibit or limit a carrier's
ability to compete.142
Sixth, revenue-generating PROW fees also create competitive
disparities and, thus, meet the California Payphone standard of materially
inhibiting or limiting the ability to compete in "a fair and balanced legal
and regulatory environment." Today, wireline, wireless, and cable-based
service providers employ disparate technologies and competitive strategies
139. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. Municipality of Guayanilla, 450 F.3d 9, 18-19 (1st Cir.
2006).
140. Id.
141. NBP, supra note 2, at 127.
142. Several commentators in the pending PROWDocket have purported to dispute the
First Circuit's common sense conclusion that excessive PROW fees inhibit broadband
deployment, and they have pointed to the example that many cities already are at or close to
one hundred percent broadband deployment. See, e.g., Coalition of Texas Cities: Comments
on the FCC's Broadband and Rights of Way Notice of Inquiry at 22-27, Acceleration of
Broadband Deployment, FCC CC Docket No. 11-59 (rel. July 18, 2011); Comments of the
League of Oregon Cities at 3-5, Acceleration of Broadband Deployment, FCC CC Docket
No. 11-59 (rel. July 15, 2011); Comments of the City of Eugene, Oregon at 6, Acceleration
of Broadband Deployment, FCC CC Docket No. 11-59 (rel. July 18, 2011); Comments of
the City of Portland, Oregon at 2, Acceleration of Broadband Deployment, FCC CC Docket
No. 11-59 (rel. July 18, 2011); Comments of the City of San Antonio, Texas at 5,
Acceleration of Broadband Deployment, FCC CC Docket No. 11-59 (rel. July 18, 2011);
Comments of the National League of Cities et. al. at 9-16, Acceleration of Broadband
Deployment, FCC CC Docket No. 11-59 (rel. July 19, 2011) [hereinafter League of Cities].
This argument suffers from several obvious weaknesses: (1) it ignores that many of these
one hundred percent deployment cities are already limited to cost-based fees by state law;
and (2) it fails to detail the degree to which broadband is deployed in these cities by
providers not subject to PROW fees. But most importantly, the argument ignores that carrier
budgeting often occurs at the regional or national level, meaning that a city's excessive
PROW fees could just as likely negatively impact resources being deployed in rural areas.
Further, these commentators argue in the same breath that they are disciplined in their
PROW pricing by the potential that carriers will respond by diverting resources to other
cities. League of Cities at 12-13, 16. The premise for this argument-that excessive PROW
charges will discourage investment in a particular city-is directly at odds with these
commentators' purported theme that PROW charges do not restrict deployment. In any
event, it is common sense that the more expenses a company incurs, the less money it
generally has for investment.
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to compete head-to-head across a broad range of voice and nonvoice
services. It is beyond expectation that any LGU could design a revenue-
generating fee (i.e., a fee unrelated to the costs firms cause when they
access the PROW) that is unbiased and nondiscriminatory among these
different competitors. It is a near certainty, however, that unfair, biased and
discriminatory fees over time will cause some existing and/or potential firm
to refrain from offering a service that it would have offered otherwise.
Competition is an effective means of directing efficient innovation and
investment, but it is an unforgiving process that punishes firms that suffer
from competitive disadvantages. As the Second Circuit recognized in City
of White Plains, "fees that exempt one competitor are inherently not
'competitively neutral,' regardless of how that competitor uses its resulting
market advantage."'143 Indeed, it is the competitors that do not build in the
PROW that are the most advantaged by inflated PROW costs, as they avoid
excessive cost inputs to which their peers are subject. As one commentator
has appropriately and succinctly stated:
Although competitive neutrality might seem to be satisfied so long as
every carrier using any right of way were charged on the same
schedule, such a limited notion ignores the presence of wireless
carriers in the market. Wireless carriers do not use rights of way to
provide service, but Congress expected as part of its general
expectation of "convergence" that wireless carriers would begin to
compete with wireline carriers for the provision of identical services.
Competitive neutrality can be maintained between wireline and
wireless carriers only if right of way charges to wireline carriers reflect
the costs of right of way use. If wireline carriers are charged a price for
right of way use that is in excess of cost, wireline service will be at an
artificial cost disadvantage and wireless services will receive an
implicit subsidy, resulting in inefficien1t4emand for wireless services-
and inefficient supply of them as well.
143. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d at 80. The Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion
in City ofSanta Fe in preempting a portion of the ordinance that required only first installers
to install and reserve capacity for use by the LGU. The Tenth Circuit recognized that
imposing such a cost requirement on carriers building in the PROW put them at a
competitive disadvantage relative to carriers that either built later or not at all. Qwest Corp.
v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1273 (10th Cir. 2004).
144. James B. Speta, Competitive Neutrality in Right of Way Regulation: A Case Study
in the Consequences of Convergence, 35 CoNN. L. REv. 763, 768 (2003). In addition,
although never raised as an issue in any reported case, it should be apparent that incumbent
carriers cannot simply "pass-through" PROW charges in order to achieve competitive
parity. Initially, many of the LGU gross revenue fees are designed to exempt the
incumbent's wholesale revenue, thus leaving no costs to pass-through to these wireline and
wireless carriers. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 221.515 (2009) (limiting Oregon municipal
franchise fees to retail local revenues). In these situations, only the retail revenues of the
carrier with facilities in the PROW are subject to the PROW fees, thus creating a situation
where customers likely would see a franchise fee on one provider's bill but not on another's.
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For these reasons, the FCC should use the PROWDocket to clearly confirm
that revenue-generating fees are effectively prohibitive under Section
253(a), so that the inquiry can be shifted to whether the fees are "fair and
reasonable" under Section 253(c).
IV. THE FCC SHOULD CLARIFY THAT "FAIR AND REASONABLE
COMPENSATION" UNDER SECTION 253(c) MEANS PAYMENT FOR
MANAGEMENT COSTS PLUS A PROVEN ECONOMIC VALUE OF THE
PROW THAT WOULD PREVAIL IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS
As described above, the interpretation of Section 253(c) has suffered
from a misplaced debate over limiting fees for accessing the PROW to the
costs that LGUs incur when firms place facilities in the PROW versus
allowing LGUs to charge additional fees for the fair market value of the
space in the PROW. Some courts have held that such fees should be cost-
based;145 some have held that they must at least be related to costs;146 and
some have analyzed whether fees are reasonable under a "totality of the
circumstances" test.147 Commentators have been equally divided between
whether Section 253(c) was intended to be limited to costs or allow for
something more.148
Further, even if wholesale revenues were included in the PROW fee base, practical
considerations would limit the ability of incumbent carrier's to pass such fees through.
Many incumbents have never had to assess city-specific fees on wholesale revenues, which
revenues are generally exempt from state and local taxation, and so they lack the billing
systems to track and bill the fees for these wholesale services. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN
& WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS § 14.02
(West 2005) (1952). And even if tracking and billing were possible, these wholesale
services are heavily regulated through tariffs or contracts, which may limit the charges that
can be passed on to wholesale customers. This means that, whether the PROW fee is based
on a gross revenue or a linear foot charge, incumbents may lack the legal or regulatory
authority to pass such fees on to their wholesale customers, thus requiring the incumbents to
essentially subsidize the business plans of their competitors by paying their proportional
PROW fees.
145. E.g., City of Auburn v. Qwest Corp., 260 F.3d 1160, 1176 (9th Cir. 2001); Bell
Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. v. Prince George's Cnty., 49 F. Supp. 2d 805, 817 (D. Md. 1999);
AT&T Comm. of the S.W., Inc. v. City of Dallas, 8 F. Supp. 2d 582, 593 (N.D. Tex. 1998);
XO Missouri, Inc. v. City of Maryland Heights, 256 F. Supp. 2d 987, 994-995 (E.D. Mo.
2003).
146. E.g., Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. Municipality of Guayanilla, 450 F.3d 9, 22 (1st Cir.
2006); Qwest Comm. Inc. v. City of Berkeley, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1100 (N.D. Cal.
2001).
147. E.g., Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1272 (10th Cir. 2004); TCG
Detroit v. City of Dearborn, 206 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2000).
148. For articles arguing that Section 253(c) limits PROW fees to costs, see Speta, supra
note 144; see also Christopher R. Day, The Concrete Barrier at the End of the Information
Superhighway: Why Lack of Local Rights-of-Way Access Is Killing Competitive Local
Exchange Carriers, 54 FED. COMM. L. J. 461 (2002); Gardner F. Gillespie, Rights-of-Way
Redux: Municipal Fees on Telecommunications Companies and Cable Operators, 107
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None of these courts or commentators has focused on whether the
PROW actually contains value for anyone other than telecommunications
carriers and other utilities that need access to provide services. The
assumption underlying the debate is that, if fees are not limited to costs, the
LGU would be entitled to charge a substantially higher amount based on
the PROW's fair market value. But this is a false assumption. In fact, the
PROW generally has little or no fair market value. This conclusion is
reached through an understanding of competitive versus monopolistic
markets and the concept of economic scarcity.
A. Competitive v. Monopolistic Pricing and the Concept of
Economic Scarcity
As the Second Circuit recognized in City of White Plains, "Section
253(c) requires compensation to be reasonable essentially to prevent
monopolistic pricing by towns. Without access to local government rights-
of-way, provision of telecommunications service using land lines is
generally infeasible, creating the danger that local governments will exact
artificially high rates." 149 In order to avoid monopoly pricing, therefore, the
PROW must exhibit aspects of a competitive market.
A competitive market is generally defined as a market in which no
single entity or combination of entities can exert undue market power to
control prices or the values of assets. so In competitive markets,
participating firms discipline behaviors through the forces of supply and
demand, and prices are driven toward the efficient firms' costs.151 Scarcity
is at the foundation of fair economic value in competitive markets. An asset
is scarce if, at a price of zero, the demand for the asset exceeds the supply.
It is closely associated with the concept of opportunity cost.152 When a
DICK. L. REv. 209 (2002). For articles arguing that Section 253(c) allows for something
more (although never defined), see Jennifer A. Krebs, Fair and Reasonable Compensation
Means Just That: How § 253 of the Telecommunications Act Preserves Local Government
Authority over Public Rights-of-Way, 78 WASH. L. REv. 901 (2003); William Malone,
Access to Local Rights-of-Way: see also A Rebuttal, 55 FED. COMM. L. J. 251 (2003);
Frederick E. Ellrod III & Nicholas P. Miller, Property Rights, Federalism, and the Public
Rights-of- Way, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 475 (2003); William Malone, Municipalities' Right
to Full Compensation for Telecommunications Providers' Uses of the Public Rights-of-Way,
107 DICK. L. REv. 623 (2003).
149. TCG New York, Inc. v. City of White Plains, 305 F.3d 67, 79 (2d Cir. 2002).
150. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICs: A MODERN APPROACH 284 (4th
ed. 1996).
151. Id. at 391-92.
152. VARIAN, supra note 150, at 23, 318, 393. As observed by Dr. Varian, "[t]he
economic definition of profit requires that we value all inputs and outputs at their
opportunity costs." Id. at 318.
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scarce resource is devoted to one use, there is less of this resource available
for other uses.
Sand in the desert is a classic example of something that is not scarce
in an economic sense. Even though there is a finite amount of sand in the
desert, if at a price of zero there is more sand available than there is
demand for it, then the sand is not scarce in an economic or market value
context. The sand still would have what is known as "use value" because it
would be useful to those who needed it, but it would have no "exchange
value" due to a lack of economic scarcity.153 Under fair market conditions,
the forces of supply and demand would drive the price of sand toward zero.
Of course, if someone expended effort to transport the sand, clean it, and
put it in bags, then the transported, cleaned, and bagged sand may
command a positive price to compensate the person for this effort because
it then would have exchange value.
In a monopolistic market, there are no competitors that discipline
price. Accordingly, if an entity has monopoly control over sand in the
desert, it can extract a positive price for the sand from those that need it,
even though sand is a nonscarce asset for which there is no opportunity
cost. This type of behavior is the exercise of substantial market power. If
unchecked, the abuse of this power can disrupt the development of efficient
and beneficial competitive markets. That is why it is often deemed
necessary to impose restrictions on entities that operate without viable
competitors. There are numerous antitrust and regulatory safeguards in
154place to guard against the creation and abuse of market power.
Generally, these restrictions set prices based upon costs, because this best
mimics a competitive market. As the FCC observed in reference to setting
prices for unbundled network elements under Section 251 of the FTA:
"[a]dopting a pricing methodology based on forward-looking, economic
costs best replicates, to the extent possible, the conditions of a competitive
market."' 5 5
153. See Guido Montani, Scarcity, in 4 THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF
EcoNoMics 253, 253-54 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) ("It may happen ... that a certain
good has use-value without having exchange value. We can imagine two circumstances
which give rise to such a case. The first concerns goods which are useful, but not scarce,
when they are not produced by labour.").
154. It bears noting that the problem of monopolistic behavior is a problem of relative
market power. That is, the unfair aspects associated with monopolies can occur when an
entity possesses substantial market power, even if the entity is not a pure monopolist, in the
sense that it is the single seller in a market. See Kurt W. Rothschild, Degree of Monopoly, in
THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF EcoNoMIcs 766, 766-68 (John Eatwell et al. eds.,
1987).
155. Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecomm. Act of 1996,
First Report and Order, FCC Docket No. 96-98, para. 679 (1996).
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B. Where the PROWIs a Nonscarce Asset, It Should Be Priced
Accordingly
Applying the principles of competitive markets to the PROW, it
would be appropriate for the LGU to assess a market rental value on a
carrier if the PROW exhibits economic scarcity and the LGU incurs a
corresponding positive opportunity cost when a firm occupies space in the
PROW. If, however, the space in the PROW does not exhibit economic
scarcity, then there is no opportunity cost associated with this space, and
there is little or no fair market value related to its use.
For consideration of the role that opportunity costs play in
determining fair market value of space in the PROW, it is important to
separate the cost associated with directly managing rights-of-way from
costs related to facilities that are lying beneath the street. Activities
involved with issuing permits, inspecting construction sites, and general
mapping of facilities are all directly related to managing rights-of-way.
These activities engender costs that add value and should be paid. They are
similar to the transporting, cleaning, and bagging of sand in the desert.
Economic scarcity and opportunity costs (and, thus, exchange value) are
associated with these activities.
In contrast, with respect to the actual space beneath the ground in the
PROW managed by LGUs, the LGUs did not incur costs to create this
space (except in rare instances), and it is unlikely that the supply of this
space would exceed demand at a price of zero. That is, no entity generally
wants access to slim tunnels beneath the roadway, other than utilities, and
absent the utilities' occupation, the space would remain vacant. In addition,
cables occupying this space beneath the street do not engender cost-causing
activities by LGU employees.156
The same is true for utility poles. Once utility poles are in place, it is
unlikely that demand would exceed supply if the price for using this space
was eliminated, as no entity generally wants access to overhead space to
string cables or other facilities along a road, other than utilities. Further,
156. There is a debate among engineers from LGUs and carriers about whether cable
installation under PROW degrades the road such that it requires additional maintenance or
early replacement. See, e.g., Pavement Degradation: How Other Cities Are Dealing With It,
AMERICAN PUBLIC WORKS AssOcIATION (Sept. 23, 2002), http://www2.apwa.net/
documents/about/techsvcs/row/products/pavement-degradation-9-02.pdf This was
presented to the 2002 APWA International Public Works Congress and Exposition, Kansas
City, Missouri on September 23, 2002. Although carriers generally deny that installations
followed by proper restoration negatively impact the life or condition of the PROW, this
would be a legitimate issue for consideration in a case in which an LGU actually attempted
to craft its fee schedule to recover such provable costs. The general practice, however, has
been for LGUs to merely assert that such degradation costs exist and to then impose a gross
revenue or linear foot charge that lacks a principled relation to such alleged costs.
Number 1]1 169
HeinOnline  -- 64 Fed. Comm. L.J. 169 2011-2012
170 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAWJOURNAL [Vol.64
once a pole is in place, it is difficult to imagine what costs LGUs incur,
other than the costs related to the costs of managing the PROW, when
another firm places its cables on the poles. As long as there is sufficient
space on the poles for all users, there is certainly no scarcity of space in the
PROW, and it is difficult to imagine what diminishment of market value an
LGU incurs when an additional firm places another aerial cable on pre-
existing poles.
This does not exclude the possibility that there are limited areas in the
PROW where the suitable space for placing facilities is scarce. Truly scarce
space in certain parts of certain metro areas is conceivable. But setting a
fair and reasonable fee related to these situations would first require
identifying such areas in the PROW. Unless LGUs can identify areas where
the demand for space suitable for placing facilities exceeds supply, or
would exceed supply at a price of zero, then there is no basis for assuming
a fair market value of more than zero.
Support for this valuation method is found in the comparable arena of
constitutional law developed around Fifth Amendment "takings" claims,
where it is government that it is seeking to use or condemn private
property. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that "just
compensation" is properly measured by the lost value to the property
owner rather than by the value it has to the government taking the
property.15 7 This also makes sense when measuring "value" under Section
253(c), where the government suffers little, if any, loss of value when its
PROW is used for occupancy by utilities. Indeed, the case for limiting
compensation is even greater in the Section 253(c) case where the
government is already receiving a benefit from the occupancy of its PROW
by the provision of beneficial communications services to its residents.
C. Scarcity Is Distinct from Negative Externalities
Recognizing that the PROW in and of itself is a nonscarce resource,
some commentators in the PROW Docket are nevertheless attempting to
justify applying a "fair market value" element to PROW fees by blending
the concepts of scarcity and negative externalities. Specifically, when
addressing scarcity in the PROW, these commentators refer to "scarcity
157. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377 (1946) ("The Constitution and
the statutes do not define the meaning of just compensation. But it has come to be
recognized that just compensation is the value of the interest taken. This is not the value to
the owner for his particular purposes or to the condemnor for some special use but a so-
called 'market value."'). See also City of Monterrey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterrey, Ltd.,
526 U.S. 687, 710 (1999) ("in determining just compensation, 'the question is what has the
owner lost, not what has the taker gained."') (quoting Boston Chamber of Commerce v.
Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910)).
HeinOnline  -- 64 Fed. Comm. L.J. 170 2011-2012
PUBLIC RIGHT-OF- WAY
and the associated negative spillover effects." 58 They claim that these
negative effects of PROW occupation include increased excavation or
construction costs, increased costs associated with design and planning,
costs associated with loss-of-services, increased travel time, and lost
revenues.s
1 5 9
In economics, such spillover effects are generally referred to as
negative externalities. A negative externality exists when an action by an
entity has a negative impact on others in a manner that is not addressed by
market pricing.160 For example, if traffic is disrupted while a carrier
accesses the PROW, the interruption of smooth traffic flow is a negative
externality. On the other hand, there are also positive externalities
associated with communications service. For example, you experience a
positive externality when people you would like to contact purchase phone
service. You also experience a positive externality to your home values
when broadband is deployed in your neighborhood.
The important point is that a negative externality does not render
otherwise nonscarce PROW scarce. Returning to the example of sand in the
desert, if removing sand from the desert disrupts an otherwise quiet
atmosphere, this could be perceived as a negative externality for those
living nearby. This externality does not make sand in the desert scarce, if at
a price of zero there is still more sand available than there is demand for
sand. It is the quiet atmosphere, not the sand, that is the scarce commodity
at issue. If some payment is deemed necessary, the appropriate amount is
determined by the impact on the quiet atmosphere. In the same vein,
negative externalities associated with accessing the PROW do not make
space in the PROW scarce. An appropriate fee, if any, is one that addresses
the costs associated with the externality, not one that treats space in the
PROW as a scarce resource.
When considering PROW fees as compensation for negative
externalities, it is important to consider two facts. First, externalities-both
positive and negative-are endemic to the experience of living in a city,
and it is neither advisable nor feasible to devise payment schedules related
158. League of Cities, supra note 142, at 40.
159. Id.
160. See VARIAN, supra note 150, at 557-77.
161. See, e.g., Glenn A Woroch, Local Network Competition, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS: STRUCTURE, REGULATION AND COMPETITION 665
(Martin Cave, Sumit Majumdar, & Ingo Vogelsang eds., 2002) ("Quite apart from any goal
of distributional equity, one reason to promote widespread access to the local telephone
network is to take advantage of 'network externalities.' These occur when each subscription
confers a benefit on all existing subscribers because they can now call, and be called by, the
new subscriber.").
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to all externalities. Consider the positive and negative externalities
associated with well-maintained yards in a neighborhood. The pleasures we
derive from our neighbors' well-maintained gardens and lawns are positive
externalities, while the noise associated with lawn mowing is often
experienced as a negative externality. We may support restrictions on times
when mowing is permitted, but we generally do not attempt to work out
payment schemes for the positive and negative externalities related to the
upkeep of our yards and those of our neighbors. For the most part, we
accept these as benefits and costs associated with living in a neighborhood.
Second, cities are most often not the entities that endure the spillover
effects described above. For example, it is perverse to claim that a city
would serve the best interests of its constituents by charging fees as
compensation for externalities associated with traffic disruption caused by
activities reasonably performed to access the PROW. This would result in
its constituents paying twice-once when in traffic and a second time when
the fees are included in their utility bills.
As stated above, if there are externalities that cause LGUs to incur
costs such as increased design time associated with carrier occupation of
the PROW, setting fees based upon a reasonable estimation of these costs is
appropriate-not because these costs make the PROW scarce, but because
they represent management costs that should be compensable (and, indeed,
are specifically recognized as compensable by Section 253(c)). Confusing
externalities with scarcity, however, does a disservice to the process of
setting fair and reasonable fees.
D. Other Valuation Methods Are Economically Unsound
Once the economics behind valuation are appreciated, it is evident
that other valuation methods discussed or adopted by courts are
economically unsound.
First, it is clear that fair market value is not determined by whether
some carriers, under certain circumstances, might pay the demanded
PROW fee. As noted by the Second Circuit in City of White Plains, carriers
naturally need access to PROW to provide services,162 and many-
particularly the larger carriers-will not allow a single LGU's fee structure
to prevent them from using the PROW when they can subsume the costs
into a broader expense base. That willingness to redistribute costs within
the carrier's business obviously does not bestow value on the particular
PROW. Indeed, many LGUs will provide access to PROW with a bait-and-
switch technique where a carrier may install its facilities for a five-year
162. 305 F.3d 67, 79 (2d Cir. 2002).
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term at a reduced rate but then see the rates skyrocket. These carriers are
then stuck with the decision of whether to abandon sunk costs or pay the
inflated fees. A carrier's decision to pay the inflated fees rather than incur
greater costs of relocating their facilities can also hardly be said to bestow
value on the PROW. As the court stated in Town of West New York, "that
the Town found willing bidders does not weigh in favor of the
reasonableness of the compensation scheme, and those bids are no guide to
what is 'fair and reasonable' under the statute."163 See also Municipality of
Guayanilla, where the First Circuit stated that "the amount that other
telecommunication providers would be willing to pay[] tells us more about
telecommunications providers' resources and their desire to comply with
local regulations than it does about why the fee chosen is 'fair and
reasonable compensation' for the state or municipality."1 64
Second, it is also evident that a gross revenue fee is an inappropriate
measure of value. The gross revenue formulas are faulty because they
assume that each carrier occupies PROW at the same proportion relative to
their overall earnings, thus ignoring that some carriers avoid installing
significant facilities in the PROW by serving only large business customers
or by leasing facilities from incumbents. The formulas also errantly assume
that facilities that are installed are evenly used among carriers when, in
truth, some carriers use less PROW by maximizing the use of their
facilities, while other carriers have overbuilt and are left with under-utilized
or unlit cables. Further, the formulas include revenue attributable to all
services, "regardless of whether the call traverses over one inch or 100 feet
of the public rights of way." 6 5 But the major problem with the formulas is
that the percentages chosen have nothing to do with PROW value. No LGU
in the reported cases bothered to argue or support that a three percent gross
revenue fee represented an actual value of occupancy of the PROW, versus
a one, five, or ten percent fee. For this reason, the First Circuit in
Municipality of Guayanilla logically stated that it would "refuse to uphold
the [five percent] fee on the off chance that it might prove to be fair and
reasonable.,,166 And the FCC noted in the TCG Amici Brief
A percentage of gross revenues-based fee, even if uniformly applied,
might well have no relationship to either the extent of each carrier's
use of the [PROW] or the costs it imposed on the [LGU]. It therefore
could be inconsistent with the competitive neutrality requirement of
163. New Jersey Payphone Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of West New York, 130 F. Supp. 2d 631,
638 (D. N.J. 2001).
164. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. Municipality of Guayanilla, 450 F.3d 9,23 (1st Cir. 2006).
165. Id. at 22.
166. Id. (quoting Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. Municipality of Guayanilla, 354 F. Supp. 2d
107, 114 (D. P.R. 2005)).
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Section 253(c). Although the FCC has not addressed the specific issue,
there also is a serious question whether a gross revenues based fee is
'fair and reasonable compep tion ... for use of [PROW]' within the
meaning of Section 253(c).
Third, there are flaws in the so-called "across-the-fence"
methodology, which some commentators have advocated in the PROW
Docket.168 This methodology uses appraisals of land values for properties
adjacent to the PROW to assess the fair market value of the PROW. This
methodology relies on the false assumption that there is a direct
relationship between the value of residential and commercial properties that
border a street and the value of the PROW. First and foremost, this
methodology ignores the fact that properties bordering the PROW
generally exhibit economic scarcity and are valued as such, while space in
the PROW generally does not exhibit economic scarcity. The positive
market value for property adjacent to the PROW is a function of demand
that equals supply at a positive price. As described above, where there is no
demonstrated economic scarcity of space in the PROW, the supply exceeds
demand even at a price of zero. This fundamental difference renders this
methodology useless for the purpose of establishing a fair market value for
the PROW. Second, this methodology ignores the fact that real estate value
is a function of the amenities of properties (views, proximities to schools,
etc.) that simply are missing from space in the PROW.
V. CONCLUSION
The FCC should use the PROW Docket as an opportunity to state a
uniform standard and return application of Section 253 to its original intent.
In particular, it is important and necessary for the FCC to: (1) confirm that
a requirement has the "effect of prohibiting" services under Section 253(a)
if it conditions use of the PROW on the payment of revenue-generating
fees; and (2) clarify that "fair and reasonable compensation" under Section
253(c) means payment for PROW management costs and for any other
proven economic value that LGUs can demonstrate that the PROW would
possess in a competitive market.
By taking these actions, the FCC can return Section 253 to its original
intent, which is the development of efficient competition and, through
efficient competition, the development of a world-class communications
industry. The role of government as expressed through Section 253 is to
ensure that competitors meet on fair and balanced playing fields so that the
167. TCG Amici Brief, supra note 134, at 14 n.7.
168. League of Cities, supra note 142, at Ex. G 20.
169. Id.
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best technologies and competitive strategies have the greatest opportunities
to prevail. A level field of play exists when all firms pay for the actual
costs they cause. Revenue-generating fees tilt the field of play and put
LGUs in the positions of picking winners and losers, which is the antithesis
of Section 253 and the FTA.
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